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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF THE
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL/DDA
MARCH 1976

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OFFICE OF PERSONNEL SURVEY REPORT

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OFFICE OF PERSONNEL SURVEY REPORT

MARCH 1976

Office of Personnel

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1. The Office of Personnel is one of the Agency's largest organizations though only about two-thirds of its careerists work in the central office itself. Its FY 1976 budget amounts to a little over [] As of late last year the Office had a staffing complement of [] full-time employees and some [] additional full and part-time workers assigned mainly to budgetary functions and related duties such as Insurance Program Management and the Credit Union. Twelve of the Office of Personnel staffers served [] [] while 18 were in some form of training and as such were charged to the so-called Development Complement.

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2. The remaining [] Office careerists serve mainly as personnel officers detailed to other components in the Agency. As of late last year some [] were so assigned within the Agency, with an additional [] at NPIC. These Office of Personnel careerists are assigned to and paid by the components they serve. [] [] The Directorate of Administration also makes much use of Office of Personnel staffers. They are also placed through the Directorate of Intelligence and the Directorate of Science and Technology, though not in such large numbers.

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3. The Office is organized in standard pyramidal fashion, so far as the main personnel functions are concerned. A chart of its organization and key personnel appears on the next page. The Director, Frederick Janney, has a broad intelligence and management background, having served at various times in his career in three of CIA's four Directorates. His Deputy, [REDACTED] has served in a number of key positions in the Office of Personnel for many years, and through his work has been associated with most important personnel activities of the Agency. Because of the particular sensitivity of adverse personnel actions on the well-being of the Agency there is a senior officer assigned directly to the Director of Personnel (Special Activities Staff) who serves as an advisor and manager of difficult personnel problems. His work cuts across all Branches within OP and, in fact, serves to support the personnel work of most offices throughout the Agency.

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Survey Objectives and Methodology

4. This survey was accomplished by a team headed by

[REDACTED] other members were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The survey was an issue-oriented inspection rather than a general study of management aspects of the Office. The objective was to develop, for the Director of Personnel and higher authority, information on the effectiveness of the major services provided by his Office and on the extent, if any, to which Office of Personnel activities could raise

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questions regarding CIA involvement in illegal or inappropriate domestic actions; to identify the sources of problems thus raised and to make recommendations for solutions wherever feasible. It was intended that the inspection develop answers to the following questions:

- a. How well does the Office of Personnel meet its customers' principal needs for personnel services?
- b. Why are major customer-perceived needs for Office of Personnel services less than fully satisfied?
- c. What should be done to reduce or eliminate customer's problems with services of the Office of Personnel?
- d. Could any Office of Personnel domestic activities be regarded as illegal or inconsistent with CIA's charter and, if so, what should be done to reduce or eliminate the possibility that they might be so regarded?

5. The inspection was guided throughout by these key questions. As a first step, the Inspection Team received briefings on the functions of the Office of Personnel by its senior executives. This provided a brief introductory look inside the Office as well as a chance to become conversant with the programs now underway, the players involved and the terminology used. We then reviewed the grievance files in the Office of the Inspector General and, concurrent with this, carried out extensive interviews with nearly all the key Agency executives in the Washington

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area. In all, the heads or deputies of 40 Offices, or the equivalent, were interviewed. The objective of this phase--which we feel was realized--was to become oriented with the Office of Personnel as perceived by others.

6. Having catalogued the problems--and the kudo's--which arose in the initial investigation, a set of hypotheses were developed which were to be tested through an in-depth survey of the Office of Personnel itself. At this point eight areas of special concern had been identified--either because they figured frequently in customer complaints, or because recommendations set forth in the Rockefeller report identified these as areas of special public concern. Some of the work duties represented by these areas of concern are handled entirely within a single component of Office of Personnel--for example, outplacement service. Other areas, however, not only cut across components within the Office of Personnel but also required further study outside that Office--for example, the human resources computer program. Once underway, the Inspection Team interviewed staff members of the Office of Personnel, studied the files in most major components of these Offices and, in many cases, studied collateral academic and professional research on such issues as the trends in personnel research in private industry, the scope and duties of the modern personnel office, and so on.

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7. It must be emphasized that the inspection did not make a major effort to examine, report or recommend on the internal

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organization and management of the Office of Personnel itself. Nor did it delve deeply into services provided by the Office which are generally perceived by Agency managers to be thoroughly satisfactory. Most of the activities of Benefits and Services Division, the Credit Union, the Special Activities Staff (adverse personnel actions), and the Contract Personnel Division came in that category. In general, the survey did not attempt to interview all personnel in any unit, nor sub-components below the Branch level. The fact of the survey was widely known throughout the Office of Personnel, however, and Inspectors were available for consultation with anyone.

8. Several areas were initially thought by the Team to require extensive study but were later dropped as not having the problems originally thought. In that category was the CIA Retirement System (CIARDS) which is generally regarded as well managed and serving Agency needs in an appropriate fashion. Conversely, initially we considered that the Position Management and Compensation Division (PMCD), having just undergone a review conducted under contract by a very senior former employee, should not be scrutinized intensively. However, a rather universal chorus of complaints by Agency managers about PMCD compelled us to revise this decision. While we by no means found evidence that all such complaints were valid, some of the more significant recommendations of the survey concern that component.

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9. This report offers a number of suggestions for enhancing the value of the Office of Personnel's services to the rest of the Agency and a few specific recommendations for effecting what we believe to be necessary changes. It also reflects throughout our judgment that the Office of Personnel is made up of highly dedicated employees who carry out their work in a professional manner in less than ideal circumstances. It is a good organization and one which is carrying its weight with the rest of the Agency.

10. The balance of this paper is divided into two major parts: summary sections and supporting Tabs, both arranged according to the key topics. Specific recommendations are mentioned in the summaries, but are spelled out only in the Tabs.

Legality and Propriety

11. An important part of this survey was the examination of practices followed in the Office of Personnel to ascertain their compatibility with the CIA charter and with U.S. law and custom. Activities that might be construed by outsiders as lacking such compatibility were scrutinized very carefully. The Office of the General Counsel was consulted in the few cases where the Inspectors had any misgivings on questions of legality. A more detailed discussion of these investigations is provided in Tab A. In all cases the charter and legal justifications for Office of Personnel activities were found to be valid. In addition, the financial practices followed by the Office were

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found to include all the normal precautions against misuse of such funds.

12. The Inspectors had particular misgivings about the permanent retention of records on job applicants for reference and use, primarily by the Operations Directorate, after staff employment efforts are abandoned. These records, under nominal Office of Personnel sponsorship, are not needed by the Office of Personnel for its own uses. This practice was determined to be legal by the Office of the General Counsel, to be technically compatible with the published description of CIA retention policy for such files, and to be justifiable under the unusual requirements of the CIA mission. These conclusions do not eliminate the possibility of adverse public reaction to the practice if its existence becomes known, however. Many CIA activities necessarily involve risk of adverse publicity and the value of this one may justify the risk. The Inspector General will bring the problem to the attention of the DDO and request a specific examination of the current usefulness of this practice. A recommendation concerning its continuation or termination will be made after consideration of the DDO response.

13. The Inspectors found that some official personnel folders contain misfiled or unauthorized materials, or fail to include some documents that are supposed to be there. Determination of the frequency and importance of such problems was not possible during this survey. Current efforts to review and improve folder

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contents were found to be very limited and no means exists to assess the completeness and accuracy of CIA folders in general.

14. It is not clear that inadequacies in official personnel folders, even if widespread, constitute a legal problem for the Agency. If, however, a significant proportion were found to contain unauthorized adverse information or to exclude important favorable materials, and Agency efforts to improve the situation remain very limited, accusations of unfair practices might receive favorable consideration by a court. In any case, even without legal incentives the Agency would want to correct such a situation. Therefore, a suggestion as to how the condition of the files might be assessed and a recommendation (No. 1) that the Director of Personnel take action to obtain such an assessment, followed by correction of the folders if found necessary, has been included on page A-12 of Tab A.

15. Official personnel records on contract employees are now divided between the Office of Personnel and Operating Components. Although inspection of the component portions of these files was not attempted in this survey, there is reason to believe that they suffer from at least as many inadequacies in content as do some of the staff employee records. As discussed above, it is not clear that such inadequacies constitute a legal problem, but they should be corrected if widespread and important. This could best be accomplished if the files were consolidated in the

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Office of Personnel. Moreover, the current recognition that the differences between contract and staff employees are diminishing supports such consolidation and Headquarters component managers were found to favor this idea, first advanced to the Inspection Team by the DDA. Therefore, a recommendation (No. 2) that contract personnel records be so consolidated has been included on page A-15 of Tab A.

Employee Personnel Records and Management Information

22. The personnel records system is the child (perhaps the victim) of the decentralized type of operation that has characterized Agency management for over two decades. This, and the complications introduced over the years by cover, compartmentalization, multiple employment categories and the like, provide ample explanation for the Agency's current patchwork of records and record systems, none of which entirely fail to do their job but none of which seem wholly adequate. The Office of Personnel deserves high credit for somehow maintaining and satisfying most needs from a mixture of non-interlocking hand and computer operated records systems, while embarked on a 13-year long effort (to date) to develop and insert data into a modern, integrated, computerized replacement. The Inspectors were very favorably impressed with the abilities, attitudes and accomplishments of the people working at these often unappreciated tasks.

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16. Considering this background, it is unsurprising that numerous complaints about records and record compilations were voiced during the customer survey. The more serious of these, concerning official personnel folders, biographic profiles, and the "skills bank" of data on employee qualifications, were examined in detail. These are discussed in appropriately labelled portions of Tab B. A recommendation (No. 1, appearing in Tab A) concerning official personnel folders has already been mentioned. Although some more minor suggestions about biographic profiles and the "skills bank" are offered in Tab B, none seem to warrant a formal recommendation. The major issue is not how to make present systems more workable, but rather to ensure that the Agency successfully and soon makes the move to an integrated, computerized personnel records management system.

17. The 13-year history of Agency attempts to develop a comprehensive human resources computer program is not a happy one. First conceived in 1963, the program was intended to amalgamate all the key data elements in a central interlocking and mutually supporting system. In 1973, after nearly ten frustrating years of effort on this so-called Support Information Processing System (SIPS), a decision was made to take a new approach--one that would still weave together the various aspects of human resource data management (personnel, financial, contract and security) but would be built in step-by-step fashion, rather

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than altogether. The new effort, called Management Assistance Program (MAPS), was placed under the Office of Joint Computer Services (OJCS) in 1974 where it continues to be developed. For the Office of Personnel, the program will culminate in the Persign II system. This will combine current and historical data from most of the now-separate systems on a wide range of personnel matters and will provide managers a readily available means of information consolidation and recall.

18. The goals of this new system appear realistic and, as stated above, we believe the early achievement of these goals to be essential. The present mix of records systems cannot satisfy current needs for accurate and complete management information. Moreover, vital functions, such as getting paychecks out on schedule, now depend on slow, costly and redundant personnel records systems which have undergone almost no modernization while awaiting the advent of a faster, more reliable, more effective, and cheaper integrated computer system.

19. While the Inspectors did not attempt to check in detail the varied efforts of the several offices concerned with the MAPS program to develop an independent estimate of its likely completion date, they found many indications that it, like its predecessor, is falling behind schedule. These symptoms, discussed in Tab B, indicate inconsistent and conflicting priorities among the Offices concerned, working-level concern that things are not going as

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planned, some organization confusion, and, possibly a certain amount of self-deception. Actions designed to improve the apparent situation, or at least establish that it is only apparent and not real, are suggested for the Director of Personnel in Recommendation Nos. 3, 4 and 5, on page B-16 of Tab B.

20. The chorus of complaints by component managers about the management information reports initiated by the DCI in 1973 were also not unexpected. The DCI's prediction that five years would pass before the Annual Personnel Plan (APP) and the Personnel Development Program (PDP) were fully developed, accepted and effectively employed appears distressingly true. Of the two reports, the APP causes component managers the greatest distress; as a result it became a focus of investigation.

21. The Inspectors found that the more serious factors inhibiting earlier acceptance of the APP are not those of report content and complexity. Although simplification of the report and its preparation procedures would help, a more important barrier to overcoming natural inertia seems to be inadequate communications between Office of Personnel and other proponents of the concept and component managers who must do the work of this Management-by-Objectives effort. This problem has been recognized by the Office of Personnel and efforts have been made to exploit available opportunities to improve communication.

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22. Some of the APP's negative image comes from data base inadequacies and statistical discrepancies, the results of which are obvious to line managers. They must themselves gather considerable data they know to exist in the Office of Personnel; they do not realize, however, that it is not readily accessible there. Moreover, their organizations simply differ from the way they are made to appear from the data that is provided by the Office of Personnel. Data base difficulties will continue to impede acceptance of the APP and, to a lesser extent, the PDP, until the new human resources computer programs become available.

23. By definition, communications involve two or more parties and all share the blame for failures. Discussion of Office of Personnel actions and attitudes related to improving their side of the problem are provided in Tab B. Although some minor suggestions for change are included, the discussion reflects a general endorsement of efforts now underway. Therefore, no specific recommendations have been made.

Internal Placement and Movement of Personnel

24. Many aspects of CIA functions and activities inhibit internal movement of personnel. Some, such as cover considerations and the lengthy training and experience required for success in many activities, create inherent limits on movement opportunities that can be overcome in only a very few cases. It has long been recognized, however, that some inhibitions are the unnecessary product of Agency culture.

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25. Because the need for improved means for effecting personnel movements--particularly between Directorates--was expressed in principle by many managers during the customer survey, this topic became an issue for examination. A more detailed description of this investigation is provided in Tab C.

26. We found the problem, although serious, to be less severe than perceived by some managers. Encouraging trends exist, particularly in the movement of senior personnel and of relatively junior personnel with outstanding talents. Office of Personnel activities to further these trends are well-conceived and useful. The sincere and extensive efforts by the Office to solve difficult relocation problems are less effective than one would like, but we believe there is little more that the Office could do. We believe the prime responsibility and action for improvement must remain with line management, including the Career Services. The commendable Office of Personnel activity is about as it should be.

Outplacement

27. Outplacement is a key element among those services designed to reduce the uncertainties, income interruptions, and other financial and emotional disturbances associated with leaving Agency employment. It is useful as a service for retirees, but could have greater value as a means of encouraging and expediting the departure of those employees who are no

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longer needed by the Agency because of manning reductions, less than complete suitability for available positions, irreparable stagnation in place, or combinations of these factors.

28. During our investigation of this issue, discussed in greater detail in Tab D, we found general agreement among component managers that the Agency needs an effective outplacement service. Almost all component managers believe the present services to be essentially ineffective; however, although more could be accomplished with a larger budget and staff, we found the success rate of present job-placement assistance efforts to be quite respectable.

29. We believe outplacement to be a valuable and necessary part of the Agency's personnel program. We found disturbing remarks by Office of Personnel officials suggesting that the function of outplacement might be the first effort cut if Office resources are curtailed further. We question the validity of thinking behind this attitude, judging the activity as an integral part of modern management in a changing Agency. Our suggestions in Tab D envision some improvement at little cost; they do not reflect the judgment that significant improvement is required, but only that some is possible.

30. Probably our most important finding is that the outplacement effort is apparently having few of the desired effects on Agency staffing because managers, and undoubtedly their subordinates, are unaware of its success. We have recommended

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(No. 6, page D-8, Tab D), therefore, that the Director of Personnel take prompt steps to correct this misunderstanding.

Recruitment and Applicant Processing

31. Office of Personnel recruiters are located in certain principal cities throughout the country. As in the past, the thrust of their recruitment activities is geared to the academic community. We have been advised that in the future more time and effort will be spent recruiting in a non-academic environment. In years gone by, recruiters have served as public spokesmen for the Agency in the areas where they are; however, more recently they have maintained a low profile and only on rare occasions will they officially represent or speak for the Agency.

32. The current quality of work by the recruiters is high. This can be attributed to, among other things, their professionalism and their supervision. The adverse publicity which the Agency has received during the past year has actually stimulated interest and applications. The buyers market created by the state of the national economy has also helped. Regardless of the cause, the recruiters are coming up with many truly outstanding candidates.

33. All personnel, both in the field and at Headquarters, who are involved in recruitment and applicant processing, were keenly aware of the inordinate amount of time that it takes for an applicant to enter on duty. Some of this time is irreducible; some, however, is of questionable necessity. We believe that

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requirements for field administration of the Professional Aptitude Test Battery (PATB) is a principal cause of processing delays. Another cause is the time required at Headquarters for the components to decide whether or not to request processing for an applicant. This is a particularly bad problem in the case of some minority applicants, where the conflict between their sometimes inferior qualifications and the need to improve the Agency's EEO record leads to protracted indecision.

34. We believe the Office of Personnel is taking all steps open to it to hold applicant processing time to a minimum. Action relating to PATB and component review delays is the responsibility of the Agency components seeking new employees. Some suggestions about conveying the need for action on these questions to component managers have been included in Tab E. That Tab also includes discussion of the apparently excessive level of recruiting effort expended in obtaining a few tens of people for the Agency's Career Training Program (CTP). The problem, which involves the components whose requirements generate the recruiting effort and the Office of Training (OTR), which manages the CTP, will be investigated further during an OIG survey of OTR scheduled to start in two to three months. Recommendations for corrective action, if still indicated, will be included in the report of that survey.

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Clerical Career Management

35. The Office of Personnel's responsibility in clerical career management is focused on establishing clerical General Schedule (GS) pay standards. The topic, discussed in more detail in Tab F, is treated separately from the Position Management and Compensation Division (PMCD) discussion in the following Tab because managers express considerable concern over Agency clerical, particularly senior secretary, grade policies.

36. The senior secretary grade subject was the topic of several Management Committee discussions in 1974/75. At Management Committee direction, PMCD surveyed 62 senior secretary positions for possible upgrading. PMCD concluded that CIA secretaries receive salaries comparable to or better than secretaries in private industry and other government agencies who perform similar duties. The PMCD survey also highlighted other problems, unrelated to salary, which cause secretarial dissatisfaction, e.g., underutilization, management attitudes, etc.

37. The IG Survey Team concurs in the PMCD findings and suggests that the management course recommended in Tab H include a section on clerical career management to better inform managers about the rationale behind clerical pay scales and about work-related problems which cause clerical dissatisfactions unrelated to salaries.

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Position Management and Compensation

39. There should be no question of the need for some system to establish and monitor job/pay equity--the equal pay for equal work principle. The Position Management and Compensation Division (PMCD), which represents to OMB and CSC an active, demonstrable effort to enforce CIA's policy of general conformance with the Classification Act, is now the heart of that system. In a broad sense, the system is fairly effective in achieving its objective; however, PMCD's contributions vary by grade and type of position. It is very effective in its influence on secretarial and clerical positions, but relatively ineffective on positions at grade GS-14 and above. This does not mean that job/pay equity is necessarily out of balance at higher grades, but only that PMCD, despite determined and sometimes irritating efforts, has little real voice in such determinations.

40. The Agency is also required by OMB to prevent escalation in its average grade and in its numbers of senior and supergrade positions. PMCD's responsibilities and authority in enforcing adherence to limits on average grade, senior slots (i.e. positions at grades of GS-14 and above) and supergrade positions are unclear. The Director of Personnel monitors the Directorates' adherence to these limits and tries to prevent excesses through use of PMCD and his formal authority to refuse authentication of Directorate-developed staffing complements--sometimes called Tables of

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Organization (T/O's). His real authority is somewhat ambiguous, however. He is empowered to monitor Directorate adherence to average grade limits, for example, but only to advise on where compensating changes may be made. Deputy Directors bear the primary responsibility for adherence to this and other limits and have most of the decision authority involved. PMCD's influence on their decisions is limited and its share of blame or credit for Agency performance is uncertain. It is important to note, however, that upward grade creep in CIA has not been significantly different from that experienced in most other Federal agencies.

41. The fact that PMCD is, among Agency managers, the least popular organization in the Office of Personnel should be no surprise; PMCD's functions and its influence on official staffing complements tend to restrict a manager's flexibility in organizing his component and providing incentives and rewards for his people. The nature and consistency of comments about PMCD by component managers point up, however, the existence of more fundamental problems than those created by this adversary relationship. These problems are discussed and analyzed in more detail in Tab G. They include managers reservations, which we share, about the comparisons used by PMCD to classify positions, PMCD's ability to understand the unique character of some component positions, the time spent in negotiating differences in how a few positions should be classified and the fact that unresolved

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differences are apt to stay unresolved. Moreover, PMCD's manpower is limited--at least in relation to its assigned responsibilities--and its scheduling is relatively inflexible. This leads to long delays--sometimes a year or more--in obtaining PMCD reviews of component reorganizations. These delays, and the unresolved differences mentioned above, lead to the existence of numerous conflicting de facto and official T/O's.

42. PMCD conducts self-initiated periodic surveys of Agency components to review position classifications and to advise managers on how their organizational structures could be improved. Component managers are usually unimpressed with such advice from reviewers lacking both managerial experience and substantive knowledge of the component. Our investigations of several recent periodic surveys indicated that few changes were really effected in individual position grades and few important PMCD-originated improvements in organization structures occurred. We concluded that the time and effort required by the surveys, at least on the three-year cycle now being attempted, is not justified by their results. We also believe that PMCD should restrict its recommendations regarding the organization and management of component personnel to cases where organization or management is the dominant consideration in evaluating position grades.

43. In practice, managers are not now unduly restricted by PMCD's recommendations or by its influence on their staffing

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complements. Undesired recommendations are frequently negotiated away or ignored. No effective system of enforcement or appeal has been formalized to deal with outstanding differences, and various mechanisms, necessary for other reasons, provide means of avoiding many of the restrictions in an unsatisfactory Table of Organization. If a controversy attracts the attention and support of a Deputy Director, his decision usually governs the actual outcome, although not necessarily the official staffing complement.

44. It has been argued that PMCD, as a component of the Office of Personnel, is buried in the Agency management hierarchy and does not have enough clout to operate effectively and to enforce its decisions (assuming it has come to rational decisions which should be enforced). It has been suggested that the function be attached to the Office of the Comptroller. We do not think the placement of the function is a significant factor in improving its accomplishment. If the function were performed competently with a greater degree of management understanding, if PMCD's authority were understood and spelled out in Agency regulations, and if its decisions could be appealed and reviewed by higher authority, then we believe it could function effectively where it is.

45. The main problem with the present Director of Personnel/DDA appeal route lies in the number and complexities of the dis-

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putes. Effective and equitable resolution of them all would require amounts of job knowledge, position classification knowledge and study time that are simply not available to those with the high level of authority and respect needed to impose an undesired solution on a Deputy Director. Creation of an appeal authority outside the four Directorates--e.g., the Comptroller or the Inspector General--would face the same set of problems.

46. Efforts are being made, as they have been for years, to reduce the number of differences by improving the quality of PMCD's judgments, improving managers confidence in those judgments and, through negotiations at various levels, to reduce unresolved differences to those few critical cases perhaps worthy of Management Committee action. We applaud the efforts to improve the quality, and thereby the acceptability of PMCD judgments. We find little new in these efforts, however, and little in the outcome of similar efforts in the past to justify an expectation that achievable improvement, however desirable, will solve the problems by itself.

47. We conclude that there are only two solutions available. The present system, lacking real enforcement authority, can be continued and probably be improved by better, semi-rotational PMCD staffing and development and implementation of better, more understandable classification standards. We believe these steps would help, but that most of the fundamental problems would remain.

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The other choice is--in addition to these steps--to make the Deputy Directors the appeal and decision authority, while preserving the Director of Personnel's capability and responsibility for monitoring their actions.

48. Whether transfer of staffing complement authenticating authority to the Deputy Directors would degrade, improve or leave unchanged the Agency's performance in job/pay equity and adherence to average grade and other manning restrictions is bound to be a controversial question. Some would regard it as setting the fox to guard the chickens. Others would contend that this, in many cases, describes the present system, and, if coupled with active and adequate monitoring by the Director of Personnel, degradation in performance is by no means an inevitable result. The more optimistic would even contend that providing control of staffing complements to those now responsible for holding average grade, senior slots and supergrades within their allocations would remove any ambiguities that may now exist as to where that responsibility lies; would provide them unambiguous decision authority over a tool important in carrying out these responsibilities, and would improve the relationship between staffing complements and reality by insuring that disputes are decided. PMCD influence on component managers during negotiated settlements might even be increased and managers might become a little less defensive and a little less inclined to employ "snow" tactics.

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49. No proof can be offered that the outcome of the shift in authority described above will be good, bad or indifferent. We are persuaded, however, that the risks of serious degradation are not great--and return to the present system would be possible if we are proven wrong. The shift could be an improvement, perhaps an important one, over the present system. We believe other possible changes in the system, such as total decentralization or creation of a supra Directorate appeal authority to be undesirable, impracticable, or both. We therefore conclude that the transfer of authority should be made. The details of our proposals are provided in the Conclusions and Recommendations (Nos. 7, 8 and 9) starting on page G-26 of Tab G.

Customer Perceptions of Agency Personnel Policy Development

50. There is a widespread perception among Agency managers that the Office of Personnel, although a very responsive and generally effective service organization, lacks initiative and innovation in developing solutions to long-standing Agency personnel problems. The more important of these perceived problems were selected as issues for examination in this survey and have been discussed in preceding sections of this report. It is evident, however, that the fact of the perception, itself, is a serious problem.

51. The perception is neither without validity nor wholly accurate. That the Office is not the initial, apparent spark-

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plug of many efforts is a product of the decentralized Agency personnel management system and of the Office's role in that system. That role, for more than twenty years, has been primarily one of service and support--activities for which the Office generally received high marks from component managers.

52. The Director of Personnel is also assigned responsibility for conducting research, for making statistical and analytical studies pertinent to Agency personnel management and for developing and recommending policies, standards and procedures for personnel management in the Agency. In the light of complaints that the Office of Personnel was not innovative, we investigated each aspect of this assignment. We found a small but ambitious, important and innovative research effort. Although current achievements in statistical and analytical studies cannot be regarded as impressive, delays in computer program development rather than lack of innovations appears to bear the principal blame.

53. Development and implementation of innovations in personnel management within CIA has been and must be a joint effort of management at many levels and of the experts from the Office of Personnel. This approach is required by the complexities, variabilities, and unique aspects of the many-sided intelligence profession. It is also a product of the Agency's organization into semi-autonomous Directorates. We therefore

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found it laudable, not blameworthy, that the Office works through and with others in its innovative efforts to improve CIA personnel administration.

54. Office of Personnel histories proved to be invaluable source documents, some eminently readable. One in particular, entitled "How We Got Where We Are;...", which digests a period ending in 1968, but from a current prospective--it was published in January 1975--should be required reading for all component managers. We believe that an understanding of how and why the Agency personnel management system developed as it did, and a resulting comprehension of how it operates today, would have stilled many, perhaps most of the "no innovation" comments.

55. Another important point emerging from the history is the length of time typically required for Agency-wide adoption of and adaption to important personnel policy developments. Six years appears to be a typical, perhaps even minimum time. Mr. Colby, as a strong and powerful proponent of one such effort, estimated a lead time of five years before the program would be fully accepted and implemented.

56. We believe that lead times such as these can and must be shortened. We share the view of component managers that our personnel management could and probably should become more innovative--but we place responsibility more on them than on the Office of Personnel for such shortcomings as exist. We

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find their misconceptions about the role and activities of the Office of Personnel to be strong evidence that they do not understand, and are therefore neglecting, their own responsibilities in the joint efforts required. The problem is primarily one of communication, compounded by the difficulty of attracting the attention of managers, busy with problems needing answers today, to equally important but more abstract issues. This communication problem involves many more personnel-related subjects than that discussed in this section of our report.

57. We propose that communication be improved through a compulsory, short, one-week training course for Washington-area Office-level managers and their deputies. The course could be presented fairly frequently, over perhaps a year, to speed the communication flow and permit attendance by all without unduly disrupting other activities. A recommendation for action in this regard is presented on page H-9 of Tab H.